In reply to tuna55 :
I'm not sure what you're referring to, but let's try to clarify it. You wrote:
If a tactical nuclear weapon is used, we (The US, not NATO) are treaty bound to directly act in defense of Ukraine, per the plain reading of the (1995?) treaty. Not necessarily with a nuclear weapon of our own, but based on what we see that hardly seems necessary.
1: Does Russia believe that we would do so?
2: Does the current administration read the treaty as I do?
3: How would NATO respond to the US acting directly?
I disagree with the basic premise. The language of the Budapest Memorandum nowhere states that the signatories are bound to defend Ukraine. It states that they have an obligation to seek action through UNSC to assist Ukraine. It was always a toothless document written to expedite the removal of Ukraine's nuclear weapons, and in 1994 no one was anticipating a scenario like we see today. If the West wanted to extend real guarantees to Ukraine, it could have, but the hard reality is that no Western country was ever going to stick its neck out for a former Soviet republic three years after the fall of the Soviet Union.
As to the other questions, it's difficult to say. Russia was clearly surprised by the unity and support in the West for Ukraine, and indications now are less about escalation and more about a possible call-up of reserves and the implementation of martial law in Russia (presumably to contend with the expected resistance). The current administration seems content with intelligence sharing and supplying arms; I see little indication that they would risk direct action against Russian forces, but nuclear use could change everything. I would expect a lot of pushback against the idea of direct US military action from some NATO members, notably France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The US (and perhaps the UK) would probably have to act alone, or at least outside of NATO channels.
Am I missing something? Did that address your points?
Some tidbits: This is complete conjecture, but there is a reasonable believe that the Ukrainians are getting very valuable info directly from captured Russian soldiers, which could very likely included purposely surrendering Russians. The reasoning is that there have been some very specific attacks that would be very difficult to formulate from normal intelligence (perhaps that general sitting in the artillery command tent was one of them).
Also of note is that it appears civilians have been evacuated form the Mariupol steel plant. The Russians are now doing heavy bombing runs on the plant. The Ukrainians are likely hiding in structures designed for nuclear attack! Of course, if you cover the entrances...
The info / vids coming out of the steel plant apparently are pretty horrific / barbaric as they have been cutoff from most all support for quite a long time. That info apparently is getting out because of the active Starlink internet, which of course is pissing the Russians off, which off course leads to Russia claiming Musk is taking part in the war... I mean, special military operation. And yes, more implied threats.
Also as a weird twist: About the only area of success for the Russians at this point has been Mariupol (excepting the steel plant, for now of course). The have failed to take over any other city of decent size. The defenders of that city are the Azov battalion, which is the only part of the Ukrainian military that has even the smallest association with something that could be called Nazism. So, some may say, not as big of a loss, and of course, the Russians might use that to say they have accomplished the "de-Nazification".
NOHOME
MegaDork
5/11/22 6:42 p.m.
I have no idea what to believe or not believe regarding this war. But I have been reading about some of the heavy weapons that are starting to reach Ukraine from the west. If the sales spiels can be half believed, russian armor is going to start having a very badder day,
russia hypes the supersonic missiles, but they seem to be a product feature without a lot of benefit for this war.
Putin's folly is breathtaking. Once he saw that Ukraine would be a E36 M3fest for the Russians he should have grabbed the Donbas region, declared victory and gone home. Now, the best outcome that he can reasonably hope for would be to grab Donbas, create a land bridge and water supply to Crimea. But even that would be tenuous, as Ukraine, with the backing of the west would amass additional weapons and throw the Rooskies out of those areas while retaking Crimea in the process.
He's run headlong into the sunk cost fallacy, which is a bit nerve-racking because basically the Russians defeat is all but insured at this point. The question is what form will that defeat take? Will it be slow and grinding, abrupt and ignominious, or will it be marked by desperation in the form of nukes?
Well, one benefit of the war (uh, I mean Police Action... uhm I mean Special Operation):
Ransomware has gone down because sanctions against Russia are making life harder for attackers
https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-has-gone-down-because-sanctions-against-russia-are-making-life-harder-for-attackers/
To be realistic, it very likely some of this is / was coming from Ukraine also.
aircooled said:
Well, one benefit of the war (uh, I mean Police Action... uhm I mean Special Operation):
Ransomware has gone down because sanctions against Russia are making life harder for attackers
I heard this as well from a federal contractor. She said they don't know all the mechanics of the ransomware/cyberattack industry financial structure but there does appear to be some relation. The fear is China or other actors will get a flurry of decent potential "recruits"
02Pilot
UberDork
5/12/22 10:02 a.m.
For anyone wanting to understand the Budapest Memorandum and the reasons for its limitations and shortcomings, I encourage you to read this short piece from the Wilson Center. As it demonstrates, both the Bush and Clinton administrations were unwilling to commit to a binding treaty that required active participation in the defense of Ukraine's territory.
I think the Libya intervention is the most likely path for any US involvement. If all the former USSR satellite countries worked together to form a UN Ukrainian defense task force of a couple hundred thousand fighters and another hundred thousand support personnel. Backed by EU logistics forces then the US may provide support through domination of the airwaves and air space.
IMO the end goal would have to include some clear endpoint for US involvement.
Alos IMO Nuclear action is not off the table from Russia. I don't see why they wouldn't use one, if those in power felt they would end up in prison or killed like Zara in Jurassic World. They created an environment that assures brutal and mutual destruction to any in the game. If any military action hit Russian soil it would have to be a a threat for which the EU/UN/USA have active counters in place.
Bit of a tangent, but I recently started reading James Hornfischer's history of the US Navy in the early cold war period, and one of the things he goes into some detail on is the famous "Long Telegram" which was sent by George Keenan, assistant ambassador to the Soviet Union, to the Secretary of State in February 1946. Keenan had lived there for many years and was very tuned in to the Russian/Soviet mindset at the time. The telegram created quite a sensation among US government officials and is considered one of the bases on which our cold war foreign policy was built.
Anyhow, the reason I bring it up is that the parallels between the Soviet Union in 1946 and Russia in 2022 are pretty striking. The sense of being "surrounded" by enemies, the paranoid, isolated leadership, the falsehoods that they attribute to the Western powers, the whole thing is still alive and well today.
Here's a link to the whole thing, it's worth a read.
An interesting map of Russian cell phones connected to the network. Weird, what could all these Russians be doing?
Give a good indication of concentration though.
02Pilot
UberDork
5/12/22 11:49 a.m.
In reply to Tom_Spangler (Forum Supporter) :
I posted Kennan's Long Telegram here some time back, but it's worth revisiting for the reasons you mention. Kennan's views were distinctly at odds with the FDR administration holdovers, who were very much of the mind that old Uncle Joe could be brought around to the American way of thinking (or were much more supportive of Soviet communism than they let on, to the point of spying against the US for the Soviets (Harry Dexter White, Alger Hiss, etc.)). Kennan found a much more supportive audience in Harry Truman, who had far fewer illusions about Stalin and the Soviets in the post-war period. If you look back at the last decade or so, I imagine you can pretty easily find a lot of people in Washington who thought Putin would come around to the American view of how the world should be.
02Pilot
UberDork
5/12/22 11:53 a.m.
In reply to aircooled :
Modern open source intel at its finest. For all the Russian efforts at operational security, they can't seem to keep their soldiers off their phones. Reminds me of a directive that went out to US forces in Afghanistan to stop using fitness trackers linked to sites that posted their activity - there was concern that they could be used to map out the layouts of US bases, and thus for targeting purposes.
Not trusting anything but Fox is quoting a tweet from the UK MOD stating Russia is recalling troops because of heavy losses and inability to gain control of key Ukrainian cities.
QuasiMofo (John Brown) said:
Not trusting anything but Fox is quoting a tweet from the UK MOD stating Russia is recalling troops because of heavy losses and inability to gain control of key Ukrainian cities....
That looks to be referring specifically to the Kharkiv region (northern most part of the Russian forces) where the Ukrainians have been heavily counter attacking, trying to push the Russians out of artillery range from the city, which it appears they have just recently done. It would not be terribly surprising to see them retreat to the border. This is also the area where there have been numerous cross boarder attacks into Russia.
Also of interest is the map that shows reports of activity today, show NO artillery strikes (just rocket strikes and warnings). I had heard that Russian artillerymen may be refusing to fire because of the rather aggressive counter battery attacks by the Ukrainians (you shoot, you get shot). The Ukrainians have received a lot of equipment for that, including the Phoenix drones which are likely longer rance more sophisticated Switchblade drone, so that situation will only get worse for the Russians. As noted, artillery is a very big part of the Russian military.
In reply to aircooled :
I've seen indications that some of the 155mm howitzers supplied by the West came with some pretty long-range projectiles, including rocket-assisted rounds. Between loitering munitions, what seems to be good drone recon capabilities, reportedly some Western-supplied counterbattery radars, and now their tubes possibly outranging Russian artillery, the Ukrainians are in a good position to do some effective counterbattery work.
In reply to 02Pilot :
There is a graphic floating around about that. The 152mm howizer the russians use are effective out to about 13 miles. The M777 155 we are sending are effective out to 17 to 25 miles depending on munitions. That's a helluva difference for an army that is relying on their artillery to soften their targets. I don't see this ending well.
It seems like the real question now is: When do the Russians dig in and concentrate on holding what they have? Generally, offensive operation are far more difficult and costly than defensive ones, so it could get a lot more difficult for the Ukrainians.
Belarus has been blustering a bit, but I am pretty sure they want none of what Putin is having, thank you.
There is still the specter of some form of general collapse in the Russian army also. Historically, the collapse of the Russians in WWI (which of course had broken down to an effective stalemate) might be relevant. That collapse of course also resulted in a wild change of political structure in Russia... most will say... not for the good...
O2. Any perspective you have on the WWI collapse that might be relevant? Not a strong point for me historically.
In reply to aircooled :
Edit: I just realized my post is generally what O2 said just a couple posts back...
The big difference right now is Precision Guided Munitions. PGM basically allow you to get the same results on Command/Communication/etc. as you would with a tactical nuke without all the extra damage and radiation--the minute the attacker learns of a key node in the defender's command structure it gets served a heaping helping of 155mm artillery accurate to within a few meters. If you add various types of drones into the mix able to detect vehicular movement day or night it's gonna get real difficult for the defender. Random units acting independently (basically "guerrillas") with small arms are going to be "sticky" but without resupply and coordination they're a short term problem for the attacker. In this situation I'd expect high percentages of Russian troops to "get lost" and find themselves in Russian territory...
tuna55
MegaDork
5/12/22 2:58 p.m.
stroker said:
In reply to aircooled :
The big difference right now is Precision Guided Munitions. PGM basically allow you to get the same results on Command/Communication/etc. as you would with a tactical nuke without all the extra damage and radiation--the minute the attacker learns of a key node in the defender's command structure it gets served a heaping helping of 155mm artillery accurate to within a few meters. If you add various types of drones into the mix able to detect vehicular movement day or night it's gonna get real difficult for the defender. Random units acting independently (basically "guerrillas") with small arms are going to be "sticky" but without resupply and coordination they're a short term problem for the attacker. In this situation I'd expect high percentages of Russian troops to "get lost" and find themselves in Russian territory...
Hurray for lend-lease! It sounds like that weapon is heavily undervalued in our own arsenal, and golly it seems that tanks are overvalued.
In reply to aircooled :
I'm no expert on the Russian side of things in the First World War, but I don't know that there's a lot of similarity. Basically, the Russians were struggling by 1917 (like everyone else), and there was a good bit of civil unrest related to shortages and such. The March Revolution resulted in riots that quickly became uncontrollable, and Czar Nicholas II abdicated in favor of the Provisional Government (or Kerensky Government) on the advice of his military leaders (many of the rioters were soldiers). Kerensky kept Russia in the war and failed to achieve much in the way of reform (the arrangement was convoluted and weak), leading to the October Revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power. Interesting side note: Lenin was in exile in Switzerland until the Germans got him out and put him on a train to Finland, where he crossed back into Russia to begin the revolution. The German plan worked - upon the success of the October Revolution, Lenin signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that took Russia out of the war, gave Germany a huge chunk of territory, and thus allowed Germany to refocus its entire army against the Western Front for the 1918 Spring Offensive (Operation Michael).
For this to compare to the current situation, I think you'd have to see a lot more unrest inside Russia first, and as badly as Ukraine has gone so far, two months in a small war doesn't compare to the fourth year of a world war. Russia lost something like three million people in the First World War, out of a population similar to what it has today. No matter what, I don't see a situation where Putin abdicates in favor of a reformer.
In reply to 02Pilot :
You're basically taking the same position as Peter Zeihan and I'm loathe to "disagree" with either of you, but I wonder whether a body count will be the primary criteria for change to happen. I have to ask whether the reaction to this "Special Operation" has functionally made Russia an international pariah (and subsequently condemned it to a downward economic/demographic path) and whether Putin's status will be the difference of how the political scale tips to a negotiated settlement or something worse...
02Pilot said:
In reply to aircooled :
I'm no expert on the Russian side of things in the First World War, but I don't know that there's a lot of similarity. Basically, the Russians were struggling by 1917 (like everyone else), and there was a good bit of civil unrest related to shortages and such. The March Revolution resulted in riots that quickly became uncontrollable, and Czar Nicholas II abdicated in favor of the Provisional Government (or Kerensky Government) on the advice of his military leaders (many of the rioters were soldiers). Kerensky kept Russia in the war and failed to achieve much in the way of reform (the arrangement was convoluted and weak), leading to the October Revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power. Interesting side note: Lenin was in exile in Switzerland until the Germans got him out and put him on a train to Finland, where he crossed back into Russia to begin the revolution. The German plan worked - upon the success of the October Revolution, Lenin signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that took Russia out of the war, gave Germany a huge chunk of territory, and thus allowed Germany to refocus its entire army against the Western Front for the 1918 Spring Offensive (Operation Michael).
For this to compare to the current situation, I think you'd have to see a lot more unrest inside Russia first, and as badly as Ukraine has gone so far, two months in a small war doesn't compare to the fourth year of a world war. Russia lost something like three million people in the First World War, out of a population similar to what it has today. No matter what, I don't see a situation where Putin abdicates in favor of a reformer.
The fundamental reason Putin is in power now is a society that hasn't self determined anything, ever.
With a culture like that it's easy to have one guy in charge.
Where America was unique in that well educated people with an independent streak started and developed that idea of independence free from the close supervision of the ruling class. As did Canada and Australia.
Never forget the French who inspired America's sense of independence as well as were the fundamental reason England couldn't mount an effective military response to the rebels.
02Pilot said:
In reply to aircooled :
I've seen indications that some of the 155mm howitzers supplied by the West came with some pretty long-range projectiles, including rocket-assisted rounds.
Interesting, I didn't think the M549 was still in wide use and I know the XM1113 is still in development. Must've been mistaken about the M549
In reply to stroker :
I think body count is a crude measurement, but it's part of the equation. Widespread popular hardship combined with a sense of the government as unresponsive or incapable of relieving that hardship is probably more important, but it's a very difficult thing to quantify. Time is another factor; the longer this goes on, the harder it is to hide the truth from your own people. The same thing happened with the Soviets in Afghanistan - no internet, state-controlled media, but eventually enough people talked to enough other people that the facts began to emerge.